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Introduction
Since the 1990s, central banks across the world have made huge efforts to increase their transparency. Central bank objectives and goals have been specified and quantified, macroeconomic forecasts are published, interest rate decisions are announced and explained immediately, and some central banks provide indications of the likely course of monetary policy in the near future.
1 Geraats (2002) provides a theoretical framework to explain the rationale for increasing central bank transparency and the effects of different types of transparency. She differentiates between five types of transparency (see Figure 1) . Political, economic, and operational transparency are factors that could enhance the credibility of a low inflation monetary policy. Procedural transparency is an obvious determinant of the quality of decision-making, and policy transparency can boost the effectiveness of interest rate setting. The empirical literature mostly finds beneficial effects of transparency. Van der Cruijsen and Eijffinger (2010) review the literature and conclude that transparency (1) improves consensus across forecasters, (2) lowers the level of inflation and anchors inflation expectations, (3) improves the credibility, reputation, and flexibility of central banks, (4) has no obvious influence on output and output variability, and (5) improves policy anticipation.
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The objective of this paper is related to the last point, 'policy anticipation'. We examine the impact of transparency on the course of short-term interest rates between two intermeeting periods. In this context, one question is of particular interest: Does transparency increase the smoothness of the adjustment process from the old target rate to the (currently, mostly 1 These inclinations can be provided via a qualitative statement, e.g., as given by the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve after every interest rate decision, or be even more sophisticated, e.g., as by the repo rate charts provided by the Sveriges Riksbank. The latter provide an explicit figure for the future repo rate over the next years in reference to different macroeconomic conditions. 2 A more detailed and stylised overview of the empirical results can be found in van der Cruijsen (2008, 30) .
expected) new target rate? A smooth transition implies lower adjustment costs for market participants and thus enhances an efficient implementation of monetary policy.
In the literature, the effectiveness of central banking in this context is measured by focussing on decision anticipation only, i.e., whether or not the actual interest rate decision was anticipated by financial markets. For example, Coppel and Connolly (2003) find that the extent to which market participants anticipate changes in the policy rate has gradually risen since the late 1980s, as has the speed of reaction to interest rate announcements. The results are quite similar across the countries in their sample (Australia, Canada, the Euro area (Germany), Japan, New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Thus, it is difficult to discover the specific contribution of a certain transparency type or to isolate any specific preferred model of monetary policy transparency. In a more recent paper, Andersson and Hoffmann (2009) compare the performances of the forward guidance strategies adopted by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Norges Bank, and the Riksbank.
They find evidence that all three central banks have been highly predictable in their monetary policy decisions, regardless of whether forward guidance involved publication of an own interest rate path.
Many papers focus on the predictability of the Federal Reserve's interest rate setting. Demiralp (2001) documents that most market rates adjust to anticipated policy actions prior to the actual announcement. Rafferty and Tomljanovich (2002) find that forecasting error has decreased since 1994 for interest rates on US bonds for most maturity lengths. Lange et al. (2003) obtain similar results and identify two components of the enhanced predictability:
gradualism in adjusting the Federal Funds interest rate target (i.e., autoregressive interest rate setting) as well as transparency regarding setting the target and future policy intentions.
Finally, Swanson (2006) shows that since the late 1980s, US financial markets and privatesector forecasters have become less surprised by Federal Reserve announcements. Lildholdt and Wetherilt (2004) show that the Bank of England's predictability improved over the period , most markedly after introduction of inflation targeting in 1992. They posit that this enhanced predictability is due to greater transparency in the monetary policy process, together with greater credibility of the Bank of England. Finally, the Bank of Canada's efforts to increase its transparency also has helped market participants to anticipate pending monetary policy actions (Muller and Zelmer, 1999 The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the data set and explains our econometric methodology. Section 3 presents the country-specific results for the influence of transparency and communication on the adjustment process between two interest rate decisions. Section 4 shows the corresponding pooled-model results. Section 5 concludes.
Data and Econometric Methodology

Smoothness Indicator
As the dependent variable, we employ a newly constructed measure that incorporates the course of short-term interest rates during the entire intermeeting period. Figure 2 shows that markets adjust gradually in the run-up to the next interest rate decision. Money market rates follow an almost linear adjustment process from the old target rate to the new one during every intermeeting period. In Figure 3 , we replace the discrete target rate steps with a linear adjustment path between two interest rate decisions. Thus, we interpolate hypothetical target rates between two interest rate meetings by the following linear adjustment process.
where the hypothetical target rate is calculated as sum of the last target rate and the gradual adjustment component. The latter is computed by apportioning the actual interest rate step over the entire intermeeting period (length n) and multiplying this apportionment factor by the number of days since the last rate decision (m). That is, when the target rate is left unchanged, the hypothetical line coincides with the old target rate. In contrast, when the target rate will be changed in, say, twenty business days, one-twentieth of the upcoming change is added every day until the actual decision. Of course, this linear adjustment process is not a perfect reflection of actual money market behaviour, but it does serve as a useful benchmark as it depicts the least volatile adjustment between two interest rate periods.
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In this paper, we examine how closely the money markets follow this adjustment line and inquire into which factors explain this behaviour. We utilise an indicator that measures the difference between the actual money market rate and the adjustment line. However, central banks have different intermeeting periods and Figure 3 shows that there are 'timevarying risk premia' in the money markets. To normalise the indicator for the intermeeting period length, we calculate the standard deviation of the spreads between the money market rate and the target rate for all intermeeting periods. We thus directly control for the length of time between two interest rate decisions and are also able to incorporate a time-varying risk premium (which is constant for every intermeeting period).
where n is the length of the k th intermeeting period. 6 This composition of the indicator ensures that abrupt and huge changes in money market rates (e.g., caused by interest rate surprises)
are penalised by the indicator, whereas a smooth and gradual adjustment will result in a particularly low number.
Transparency Index
In a next step, we need to parameterise central bank transparency. The index from Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) , which was updated by Siklos (2010) , is commonly used for this purpose.
7
This index captures all categories in the theoretical framework by Geraats (2002) and is available as a yearly time series covering our sample period. For each category (political, economic, procedural, policy, and operational transparency), three questions address different aspects of transparency (a short excerpt of the Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) disturbances. In addition to employing the overall index as an explanatory variable, we also take advantage of the subindices and individual questions to discover which transparency factors are particularly important.
Central Bank Communication
In our analysis, we evaluate the impact of informal central bank communication on the smoothness of the money market adjustment process. Some central banks communicate often with the public (e.g., the ECB and the Fed), while others (e.g., RBA, BOC, or RBNZ) engage in informal communication much less frequently. 8 It could be argued that inflation-targeting countries do not need to communicate as frequently as, e.g., the United States, as their primary objective is explicitly quantified. However, even inflation-targeting countries need to enhance and maintain credibility. Furthermore, they have some room for discretion in their interest rate setting as they mostly bound to an inflation band and not to a single figure. They can also be hit by unexpected macroeconomic disturbances and will need to communicate that they are aware of the disturbances and explain how they are going to deal with them.
9
However, every speech can contain valuable information for financial market agents no matter what the occasion for the speech. The audience has the opportunity to ask questions of particular interest, e.g., about the future course of monetary policy or the economic outlook.
Thus, every informal speech should be considered as a potential source of information. The general specification is as follows:
where α, β, γ, δ, η, and λ are parameters and ε is an i. (White, 1980) or heteroscedasticity-and autocorrelation-consistent (Newey and West, 1987) standard errors are used if necessary. 13 We also considered a dummy variable for the intermeeting period surrounding 9/11. However, this dummy variable exerts no noticeable influence on the results and thus is omitted from the analysis. 14 Of course, the dependent variable is censored as it can take values only of zero or greater. However, Tobit estimations (Tobin, 1958) and the corresponding marginal effects confirm our results. 15 There are no ARCH effects (Engle, 1982) in the country-specific or pooled models at a 5 percent significance level or better.
Second, a pooled model including all nine countries is utilised. In addition to the obvious gain in the number of observations, a pooled model allows a more detailed examination of the subindices as the variation increases with the number of countries. 16 The multi-country model cannot be estimated as a balanced panel as each of the central banks has its own interest rate setting calendar, with substantial variation in the number of target rate decisions per year. Thus, we estimate the corresponding pooled OLS model for Equation (4).
The only difference is that country-specific effects are included using the United States as the reference country.
Country-Specific Results
Table 1 sets out the results for the country-specific models. 16 An obvious drawback is the assumption of equal coefficients across countries and a common error structure. Nonetheless, the selection of a homogenous group of countries should minimise these potential problems. The transparency indicator exerts a significant and theory-consistent (i.e., decreasing) impact in five out of eight countries. 18 The largest impact can be found in the United Kingdom, as a one-unit increase in the index decreases the smoothness indicator by 6.38 bps.
The adjustment process is also affected in SUI (-3.33 bps), CAN (-3 bps), and AUS (-2.12 bps), whereas the coefficient for SWE (-0.31 bps) is significant only at the 10 percent level. (1) The BOJ has faced the zero interest bound problem since the mid-1990s and thus there are only five interest rate changes during our sample period, which makes the interest rate course easy to predict. (2) The BOJ meets at very high frequency (137 17 Statistical tests of differences in means under the assumption of independent samples do not reveal differences between the significant coefficients. 18 There is no variation in the US transparency index during our sample period. 19 Statistical tests show that the coefficient is the smallest in Sweden (vs. UK: z = 2.24**; vs. SUI: z = 2.29**; vs. CAN: z = 2.74***; vs. AUS: z = 2.97***), while failing to differentiate between the other countries. 20 The impact is statistically indifferent from a one-unit change in the transparency index (F(1,28) = 0.35). 21 In the case of AUS (F(1,86) = 1.73) and CAN (F(1,48) = 0.07), the impact of transparency and communication is statistically equal. Statistical testing also fails to differentiate between the impact of communication in these four countries. 22 Nonetheless, the coefficients for interest rate smoothing (p = 0.11) and the transparency index (p = 0.18) in NZ are only marginally insignificant at the 10 percent level.
observations in our sample), which further facilitates understanding its future course. rate decisions nor the exclusion of these events changes the results. Finally, instead of using the aggregated transparency index, we employ its subindices to discover which transparency factors are particularly important. However, there is rarely enough variation within one country, which is one major reason for pooling the country samples. Table 2 shows the results of the pooled model. Model (1) Tables A1 and   23 The Japanese smoothness indicator has the lowest mean and standard deviation of all nine countries (see Table  A2 ). 24 The ECB smoothness indicator has the second smallest mean and one of the smallest standard deviations (see Table A2 ). 25 Including an interaction term between communication and transparency to Model (1) yields an insignificant coefficient and confirms this impression.
Multi-Country Results
A3: central banks with a high frequency of informal speeches are not necessarily the most transparent ones, and vice versa.
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As in the country-specific models, interest rate smoothing contributes to understanding monetary policy. The indicator goes down by 1.75 bps in Models (1) and (2) Notes: ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. White (1980) standard errors are used if heteroscedasticity was detected. Newey-West (1987) standard errors are used if autocorrelation was detected. Country-specific effects cannot be excluded (F(8,752) = 4.06***; F(8,753) = 4.40***; F(8,753) = 4.58***).
Another novel aspect of this paper is that we assess the influence of all subcategories of Eijffinger and Geraats's (2006) transparency index (political, economic, procedural, policy, and operational). The results are displayed in Table 3 . 28 The fit is virtually the same in all five 26 The correlation coefficient between average communication and average transparency per country over the sample period is -0.14. 27 The impact is statistically indifferent from a 1 percent change in central bank speeches (F(1,752) = 2.30). 28 Including all five subcategories in one model results in collinearity problems. models (the R 2 ranges from 0.42 to 0.43). The coefficients for communication and interest rate smoothing are almost unchanged from the results in Table 2 .
Although all subcategories have a theory-consistent declining impact on the indicator, there is some variation across the different subindices. The largest impact is found for political transparency, which has to do with openness about policy objectives (e.g., a formal statement and prioritization of objectives or a quantification of the primary objective). If a central bank has a clear and quantified mandate, e.g., an inflation target, it is very easy for market participants to anticipate the bank's future monetary policy. Second in terms of influence is procedural transparency, which includes (among other things) an explicit monetary policy rule and an account of the policy deliberations. Again, this helps to explain how past decisions were reached and thus facilitates prediction of interest rates in the near future. Operational transparency (though only significant at the 10 percent level) ranks third in impact. Notes: ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. White (1980) standard errors are used if heteroscedasticity was detected. Newey-West (1987) standard errors are used if autocorrelation was detected. Country-specific effects cannot be excluded (F(8,752) = 3.78***; 4.61***; 5.95***; 3.59***; 3.75***). Full tables are available on request.
Geraats (2002) views policy transparency as a factor that could boost the effectiveness of interest rate setting. Thus, it is at first a bit surprising that the prompt disclosure and explanation of policy decisions and an explicit policy indication of likely future policy action exert a much smaller impact than all other categories (except economic transparency).
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However, all central banks promptly disclose their decisions and perhaps the information contained in explanations of likely future interest rate decisions can also be obtained by studying discussions of past interest rate decisions (procedural transparency). Finally, economic transparency is the least important category. These days, publicly available macroeconomic data and forecasts are almost as accurate as those provided by the central 29 The tests of differences in means under the assumption of independent samples show that political transparency is more important than policy and economic transparency (z = 1.88* and z = 2.02**, respectively). Similar differences can be found for procedural transparency and policy and economic transparency (z = 1.72* and z = 2.24**, respectively).
bank. Thus, there may not be much benefit in providing internal data and the macroeconomic model to the public.
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The data set by Siklos (2010) also provides the score for all 15 questions utilised in creation of the index. Notes: ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. White (1980) standard errors are used if heteroscedasticity was detected. Newey-West (1987) standard errors are used if autocorrelation was detected. Country-specific effects cannot be excluded (F(8,752) = 3.78***; 3.96***; 4.26***; 4.96***; 5.95***; 3.90***; 5.92***; 2.57***; 5.00***; 4.72***). An excerpt of the Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) questionnaire can be found in the Appendix. Full tables are available on request.
Second in terms of reaction size is Q1a: 33 a formal statement of the objective(s) of monetary policy is provided by all central banks in our sample; thus, it is explicit 30 We also try to evaluate the impact of conditional policy rate projections (not captured by the index) as published by the RBNZ since 1999 and the Riksbank since 2007. However, the coefficient is insignificant as the variable mostly coincides with the country-specific effects for NZ. 31 We are able to employ only 10 of these questions as (i) in some cases the variation coincides with country dummies and we cannot distinguish the impact from a country-specific effect or (ii) there is no variation in the variable at all. Therefore, Q1b and Q1c (political transparency), Q3a and Q3b (procedural transparency), and Q4a (policy transparency) have to be omitted from the analysis. 32 Statistical tests show that it exerts a larger influence than all other questions (except Q1a and Q5c): Q2a (z = 1.73*), Q2b (z = 2.71***), Q2c (z = 2.29**), Q3c (z = 1.84*), Q4b (z = 3.01***), Q4c (z = 1.84*), and Q5a (z = 2.43**). 33 The impact is statistically larger than for questions Q2b (z = 1.93*), Q4b (z = 2.27**), and Q5a (z = 1.83* interact the speeches with the (absolute) size of the interest rate step. The prior is that communication could have an additional facilitating effect on large adjustments. However, the first three robustness tests do not affect the results presented above, and the last has no significant impact. Thus, we retain our parsimonious specification.
Conclusions
In this paper, we study the impact of central bank transparency and informal central bank communications on the money market adjustment process between two interest rate decisions.
The sample covers nine major central banks (RBA, BOC, ECB, BOJ, RBNZ, Riksbank, SNB, BOE, and the Fed) for the period from January 1999 to July 2007. We employ a continuous test for the influence of both factors using an adjustment indicator that incorporates the behaviour of short-term interest rates during the entire intermeeting period. Country-specific OLS models and a pooled OLS model reveal several interesting results.
First, in case of the country-specific models, a higher degree of transparency leads to a smoother transition from the old target rate to the new one in the UK, SUI, CAN, AUS, and SWE. Informal central bank speeches by the SNB, Fed, RBA, and BOC also contribute to an improved adjustment in the money markets. JAP and the EMU are virtually unaffected by both variables but show the smoothest adjustments in the first place (partly due to their frequent decision schedule). Gradualist interest rate setting also facilitates a smooth transition in all countries except NZ and SWE. The pooled regressions confirm the country-specific 34 Note that there is only joint variation in both variables. Thus, we cannot assign the impact exclusively to one of the questions. 
